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Roots	  of	  Violence	  in	  Colombia	  
Armed	  Actors	  and	  Beyond	  
	  
By	  John	  H.	  Coatsworth	  
	  
Colombia	  has	  suffered	  from	  high	  levels	  of	  armed	  strife	  for	  most	  of	  its	  history.	  The	  
current	  strife	  it	  is	  experiencing	  is	  not	  unusual	  either	  in	  length	  or	  death	  toll.	  
	  
In	  the	  19th	  century,	  killing	  people	  required	  more	  effort	  because	  primitive	  weapons	  
often	  misfired	  or	  missed	  altogether.	  Nonetheless,	  between	  the	  1820s	  and	  1879,	  an	  
estimated	  35,000	  Colombians	  (out	  of	  a	  million	  or	  so	  inhabitants)	  lost	  their	  lives	  in	  civil	  
warfare.	  As	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  population,	  this	  is	  roughly	  the	  equivalent	  of	  a	  US	  death	  
toll	  of	  five	  to	  ten	  million	  between	  1950	  and	  2000.	  Or	  about	  half	  a	  million	  Colombians	  in	  
the	  same	  half	  century—not	  far	  from	  the	  rate	  of	  the	  actual	  numbers.	  
	  
Colombian	  violence	  has	  reached	  at	  least	  a	  dozen	  peaks	  of	  intensity	  since	  the	  1820s.	  The	  
20th	  century	  dawned	  over	  a	  paroxysm	  of	  partisan	  strife	  known	  to	  history	  as	  the	  War	  of	  
a	  Thousand	  Days.	  Subsequently,	  from	  1948	  to	  1964,	  some	  80,000	  to	  200,000	  died	  in	  
murderous	  partisan	  warfare	  that	  came	  to	  be	  called	  “La	  Violencia.”	  More	  than	  50,000	  
died	  in	  the	  Drug	  Wars	  of	  the	  1980s	  and	  in	  the	  escalating	  guerrilla	  warfare	  of	  the	  1990s.	  
	  
Death	  tolls	  this	  high	  for	  such	  a	  long	  time	  are	  unusual,	  even	  in	  the	  20th	  century.	  As	  many	  
as	  a	  million	  people	  may	  have	  died	  in	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution,	  but	  more	  perished	  from	  
disease	  and	  dislocation	  than	  combat.	  In	  more	  recent	  times,	  the	  last	  paroxysms	  of	  the	  
cold	  war	  imposed	  a	  heavy	  toll	  on	  Latin	  America—30,000	  died	  in	  Argentina	  between	  
1976	  and	  1982,	  perhaps	  300,000	  in	  the	  Central	  American	  wars	  between	  1978	  and	  the	  
early	  1990s.	  Other	  examples	  could	  be	  cited,	  but	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  escape	  the	  conclusion	  
that	  Colombia’s	  history	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  violent	  in	  the	  hemisphere,	  with	  organized	  
killing	  existing	  at	  chronically	  high	  levels,	  punctuated	  with	  episodes	  of	  high	  intensity	  
murderousness,	  for	  nearly	  two	  centuries.	  
	  
Why	  has	  Colombia	  suffered	  from	  high	  levels	  of	  endemic	  violence	  for	  such	  a	  long	  time?	  
What	  conditions	  have	  tended	  to	  cause	  already	  high	  homicide	  rates	  to	  escalate	  into	  
intense	  periods	  of	  mass	  murder?	  
	  
Historians	  of	  Colombia	  usually	  cite	  two	  sets	  of	  causes	  for	  the	  routinely	  high	  rates	  of	  
homicide	  Colombia	  has	  experienced	  since	  the	  last	  century.	  The	  first	  is	  Colombia’s	  
exceptionally	  difficult	  geography.	  The	  second	  involves	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  country’s	  
political	  leaders	  and	  their	  followers	  to	  design	  effective	  institutions	  of	  government	  and	  
make	  them	  work.	  
	  
In	  their	  outstanding	  survey	  of	  Colombian	  history,	  published	  last	  year	  and	  
entitled	  Colombia:	  Fragmented	  Land,	  Divided	  Society,	  Marco	  Palacios	  and	  Frank	  Safford	  
argue	  that	  “spatial	  fragmentation…has	  found	  expression	  in	  economic	  atomization	  and	  
cultural	  differentiation.	  The	  country’s…most	  populated	  areas	  have	  been	  divided	  by	  its	  
three	  mountain	  ranges…into	  isolated	  mountain	  pockets…that	  fostered	  the	  development	  
of	  particularized	  local	  and	  regional	  cultures,	  regional	  antagonism	  and	  local	  rivalries…”	  
	  
Because	  of	  its	  geographic	  fragmentation,	  much	  of	  rural	  Colombia	  did	  not	  come	  to	  be	  
settled	  until	  well	  into	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  As	  Palacios	  and	  Safford	  point	  out,	  these	  
internal	  “frontiers”	  remained	  virtually	  stateless	  for	  decades.	  As	  in	  other	  frontiers,	  the	  
lack	  of	  effective	  mechanisms	  for	  the	  enforcement	  of	  basic	  property	  and	  civil	  rights	  
promoted	  violence.	  Vigilantes,	  private	  police	  working	  for	  big	  landowners,	  peasant	  and	  
community	  defense	  organizations,	  local	  mafias	  and	  clans	  all	  proliferated	  and	  fought	  
each	  other.	  
	  
Why	  did	  Colombia’s	  internal	  frontiers	  remain	  virtually	  lawless	  and	  stateless	  for	  so	  much	  
longer	  than	  other	  frontier	  regions?	  Two	  reasons	  stand	  out	  among	  many.	  First,	  imposing	  
orderly	  government	  and	  providing	  minimal	  services	  like	  police	  protection,	  a	  functioning	  
judiciary,	  schools,	  and	  the	  like	  is	  more	  costly	  in	  Colombia’s	  difficult	  terrain	  than	  in	  most	  
other	  countries.	  Second,	  Colombia’s	  political	  institutions	  developed	  in	  a	  way	  that	  
promoted	  the	  development	  of	  political	  parties	  as	  substitutes	  for	  government.	  
	  
For	  much	  of	  Colombia’s	  history,	  local	  violence	  was	  linked	  to	  the	  two	  main	  political	  
parties,	  the	  Conservative	  and	  Liberal	  parties.	  Until	  the	  1991	  Constitution,	  20th-­‐century	  
Colombia	  operated	  under	  rules	  that	  gave	  the	  president	  of	  the	  country	  the	  right	  to	  
appoint	  all	  local	  and	  state	  executives.	  Local	  and	  state	  legislatures,	  however,	  had	  to	  be	  
elected	  every	  two	  years.	  The	  result	  was	  a	  lethal	  combination	  of	  mayors	  and	  governors	  
appointed	  from	  Bogotá	  facing	  noisy	  and	  potentially	  disruptive	  local	  legislatures.	  
	  
The	  president’s	  appointees	  often	  struggled	  just	  to	  control	  the	  urban	  areas	  assigned	  to	  
them.	  Outside	  the	  main	  cities,	  and	  especially	  in	  recently	  settled	  areas,	  government	  
barely	  functioned,	  with	  local	  people	  left	  to	  fend	  for	  themselves.	  In	  many	  areas,	  the	  two	  
traditional	  parties	  fought	  for	  control,	  often	  violently.	  They	  forged	  links	  to	  local	  interests,	  
recruited	  allies,	  developed	  or	  absorbed	  existing	  patronage	  networks,	  and	  merged	  with	  
local	  mafias	  and	  clans.	  Villages	  and	  towns	  came	  to	  be	  identified	  as	  either	  Liberal	  or	  
Conservative	  territory.	  The	  areas	  of	  internal	  colonization	  and	  frontier	  lawlessness	  
coincide	  with	  the	  areas	  of	  modern	  guerrilla	  and	  paramilitary	  activity.	  
	  
Many	  other	  problems	  contributed	  to	  the	  chronic	  violence	  of	  the	  Colombian	  countryside,	  
including	  poverty	  and	  inequality.	  Historians	  also	  cite	  Colombia’s	  Catholic	  Church	  as	  
another	  polarizing	  element.	  The	  Church	  resisted	  modernizing	  trends	  longer	  in	  Colombia	  
than	  elsewhere;	  it	  was	  staunchly	  reactionary,	  wedded	  to	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	  and	  
opposed	  to	  the	  separation	  of	  church	  and	  state	  as	  well	  as	  public	  education	  until	  the	  
1960s	  and	  1970s.	  
	  
Amazingly,	  over	  the	  past	  half	  century,	  Colombia	  has	  managed	  to	  achieve	  steady	  
economic	  growth	  at	  a	  moderate	  pace,	  neither	  as	  high	  as	  the	  Asian	  tigers	  nor	  as	  anemic	  
as	  most	  other	  Latin	  American	  nations.	  A	  modern	  Colombia	  of	  middle	  classes	  and	  urban	  
sprawl	  thus	  grew	  and	  prospered,	  despite	  endemic	  rural	  violence.	  When	  conditions	  
deteriorated	  enough	  to	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  life	  in	  the	  cities,	  as	  they	  did	  from	  time	  to	  
time,	  unhappy	  urban	  voters	  compelled	  political	  elites	  to	  do	  something.	  The	  most	  
significant	  of	  all	  such	  efforts,	  occasioned	  by	  the	  Drug	  Wars	  of	  the	  1980s,	  was	  the	  
adoption	  of	  a	  new	  Constitution	  adopted	  in	  1991,	  which	  democratized	  local	  and	  state	  
government	  by	  making	  mayors	  and	  governors	  subject	  to	  election	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  
more	  than	  a	  century.	  
	  
Unfortunately,	  the	  new	  Constitution	  did	  not	  calm	  the	  country,	  for	  two	  reasons	  
principally.	  First,	  by	  the	  time	  the	  Constitution	  was	  adopted,	  the	  Drug	  Wars	  of	  the	  late	  
1980s	  had	  nearly	  destroyed	  the	  country’s	  judicial	  and	  law	  enforcement	  institutions.	  
Second,	  the	  Colombian	  government	  had	  lost	  credibility	  as	  a	  partner	  in	  peace	  talks	  with	  
armed	  guerrillas.	  
	  
From	  the	  1970s	  to	  1985,	  chronic	  violence,	  especially	  in	  the	  countryside,	  kept	  Colombia’s	  
homicide	  rate	  in	  the	  range	  of	  20-­‐39	  per	  100,000	  population,	  high	  by	  international	  
standards,	  but	  not	  much	  above	  Brazil	  and	  Mexico.	  Then	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  drug	  cartels	  
began	  a	  campaign	  of	  terror	  and	  assassination,	  aimed	  at	  stopping	  the	  extradition	  of	  drug	  
trafficking	  defendants	  from	  Colombia	  to	  the	  United	  States	  for	  trial.	  They	  also	  redoubled	  
their	  efforts	  to	  undermine	  the	  police	  and	  courts	  through	  bribery	  and	  threats.	  Colombia’s	  
homicide	  rate	  soared	  to	  57	  in	  1985,	  86	  in	  1990	  and	  95	  in	  1993.	  In	  the	  Department	  
(province)	  of	  Antioquia,	  which	  includes	  the	  city	  of	  Medellín,	  the	  homicide	  rate	  oscillated	  
between	  245	  and	  400	  per	  100,000	  in	  the	  early	  1990s.	  The	  high	  murder	  rates	  coincided	  
with	  rapidly	  increasing	  rates	  of	  all	  kinds	  of	  crimes	  against	  property	  and	  people	  as	  the	  
criminal	  justice	  system	  nearly	  collapsed.	  The	  new	  constitution	  could	  not	  repair	  this	  
damage.	  
	  
Among	  those	  who	  lost	  their	  lives	  in	  these	  years	  were	  more	  than	  3,000	  candidates	  for	  
public	  office,	  including	  a	  major	  presidential	  contender.	  Most	  of	  those	  killed	  were	  former	  
guerrillas	  who	  had	  accepted	  a	  government	  peace	  offer,	  laid	  down	  their	  arms,	  and	  
agreed	  to	  seek	  peaceful	  change	  through	  the	  ballot	  box.	  Most	  were	  assassinated	  by	  right	  
wing	  paramilitary	  groups,	  some	  of	  whom	  were	  collaborating	  with	  serving	  officers	  and	  
units	  of	  the	  Colombian	  military	  or	  police	  agencies.	  The	  government’s	  failure	  to	  protect	  
these	  former	  guerrillas	  running	  for	  elective	  office	  cast	  a	  pall	  on	  all	  subsequent	  
negotiations	  with	  rebel	  groups:	  another	  key	  problem	  that	  the	  new	  constitution	  could	  
not	  solve.	  
	  
The	  Constitution	  of	  1991	  did	  help	  to	  end	  the	  Drug	  Wars	  by	  prohibiting	  extradition.	  The	  
government	  then	  negotiated	  the	  surrender	  of	  several	  key	  drug	  cartel	  leaders	  by	  
agreeing	  to	  give	  them	  light	  sentences	  served	  in	  comfortable	  surroundings	  in	  exchange	  
for	  their	  pledges	  never	  to	  engage	  in	  drug	  trading	  again.	  But	  just	  as	  the	  Drug	  Wars	  ended,	  
the	  guerrilla	  wars	  heated	  up.	  
	  
The	  two	  main	  guerrilla	  organizations,	  the	  Revolutionary	  Armed	  Forces	  of	  Colombia	  
(FARC)	  and	  the	  National	  Liberation	  Army	  (ELN),	  are	  believed	  to	  have	  benefited	  from	  the	  
collapse	  of	  law	  enforcement	  and	  the	  break-­‐up	  of	  the	  drug	  cartels.	  Both	  are	  said	  to	  have	  
provided	  protection	  for	  a	  new	  generation	  of	  drug	  producers	  and	  traffickers	  in	  exchange	  
for	  taxes	  and	  contributions	  running	  in	  the	  hundreds	  of	  millions	  of	  dollars	  each	  year.	  
They	  began	  paying	  their	  soldiers	  monthly	  salaries	  and	  re-­‐equipped	  them	  with	  the	  best	  
weapons	  available	  on	  the	  international	  arms	  black	  market.	  The	  right	  wing	  paramilitary	  
forces	  are	  said	  to	  rely	  even	  more	  heavily	  on	  income	  derived	  from	  drugs.	  
	  
The	  United	  States	  could	  help	  to	  reduce	  violence	  in	  Colombia	  by	  decriminalizing	  
production	  and	  sale	  of	  prohibited	  substances	  to	  adult	  consumers.	  Though	  unlikely	  to	  
happen	  any	  time	  soon,	  such	  a	  step	  would	  take	  most	  of	  the	  high	  risk	  super	  profits	  out	  of	  
the	  drug	  trade	  and	  deprive	  the	  guerrillas,	  and	  especially	  the	  paramilitary	  forces,	  of	  their	  
means	  of	  financing	  their	  activities.	  Instead,	  the	  United	  States	  has	  opted	  to	  provide	  
military	  assistance	  to	  the	  Colombian	  government	  to	  balance	  the	  help	  provided	  indirectly	  
to	  the	  guerrillas	  and	  paramilitary	  groups	  by	  U.S.	  consumers	  of	  cocaine	  and	  heroin.	  This	  
strategy	  calls	  for	  intensifying	  the	  violence	  on	  the	  theory	  that	  the	  government	  can	  win,	  or	  
at	  least	  drive	  the	  rebels	  to	  negotiate	  seriously.	  
	  
The	  new	  Colombian	  president	  Álvaro	  Uribe	  also	  appears	  determined	  to	  intensify	  the	  war	  
against	  the	  guerrillas.	  He	  has	  also	  demanded	  that	  the	  paramilitary	  forces	  disarm.	  It	  is	  
impossible	  to	  predict	  how	  effective	  these	  new	  military	  offensives	  will	  be.	  But	  Colombia’s	  
history	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  military	  victories	  have	  never	  addressed	  the	  deeper	  roots	  of	  
violence	  and	  have	  thus	  provided	  little	  more	  than	  brief	  respites.	  To	  build	  a	  peaceful	  
country,	  Colombians	  will	  need	  to	  face	  at	  least	  three	  difficult	  sets	  of	  issues,	  none	  easy	  to	  
address	  amid	  violent	  conflict.	  
	  
The	  first	  issue	  is	  how	  to	  defend	  and	  even	  restore	  human	  rights	  as	  the	  violence	  
intensifies.	  It	  is	  possible	  for	  governments	  to	  win	  guerrilla	  wars	  by	  making	  more	  effective	  
use	  of	  mass	  murder	  and	  brutality	  than	  their	  opponents.	  This	  is	  what	  the	  historian	  
Tacitus	  had	  in	  mind	  when	  he	  said	  of	  Rome’s	  conquests	  in	  Gaul,	  “They	  make	  a	  desolation	  
and	  call	  it	  peace.”	  As	  other	  Latin	  American	  cases	  have	  amply	  demonstrated,	  the	  
dynamic	  of	  desolation	  is	  hard	  to	  stop	  or	  even	  to	  modify.	  Yet	  Colombia’s	  government	  will	  
not	  have	  solved	  the	  nation’s	  historic	  problem	  of	  endemic	  violence	  unless	  it	  can	  create	  
institutions	  that	  effectively	  protect	  human,	  civil,	  and	  property	  rights.	  
	  
The	  second	  issue	  is	  how	  to	  create,	  strengthen	  and	  institutionalize	  effective	  democratic	  
governance	  throughout	  Colombia.	  If	  the	  current	  strife	  were	  to	  end	  as	  all	  others	  in	  
Colombian	  history	  have	  ended,	  with	  exhaustion	  and	  bitterness,	  but	  without	  a	  firm	  
commitment	  to	  the	  costly	  but	  indispensable	  task	  of	  creating	  truly	  effective	  and	  broadly	  
representative	  governing	  structures	  that	  function	  everywhere,	  the	  homicide	  rate	  will	  
not	  fall	  below	  Colombia’s	  chronically	  high	  levels	  of	  the	  past,	  and	  new	  episodes	  of	  acute	  
violence	  will	  follow	  again	  sooner	  rather	  than	  later.	  Essentially,	  Colombia’s	  urban	  middle	  
classes	  and	  elites	  will	  have	  to	  signal	  a	  new	  and	  unprecedented	  willingness	  to	  pay	  the	  
huge	  costs	  of	  creating	  a	  modern	  nation—rather	  than	  the	  shaky	  archipelago	  of	  modern	  
cities	  surrounded	  by	  an	  ocean	  of	  neglect	  that	  exists	  now.	  
	  
The	  third	  and	  final	  great	  issue	  is	  how	  to	  strengthen	  and	  engage	  civil	  society	  in	  the	  effort	  
to	  restore	  and	  consolidate	  peace	  in	  the	  country.	  The	  fact	  is	  that	  Colombia	  already	  has	  an	  
active,	  indeed,	  a	  hyperactive	  and	  engaged	  civil	  society.	  In	  fact,	  violence	  throughout	  
Colombian	  history	  has	  come	  in	  large	  part	  from	  the	  activities	  of	  non-­‐governmental	  civil	  
society	  organizations,	  from	  political	  parties	  and	  vigilantes	  to	  paramilitary	  groups	  and	  
drug	  cartels.	  Creating	  opportunities	  for	  Colombia’s	  vibrant	  civil	  society	  organizations	  to	  
play	  a	  constructive	  and	  significant	  role	  in	  making	  peace	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  civil	  strife	  may	  be	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